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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some Pro-
found interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."-OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECrE LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.
Recent Cases
LIBEL-CHARGING A CLERGYMAN WITH
BEING AN HERETIC
Creekmore v. Runnels1
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a dismissal and held that the alleged
contents of a letter allegedly published to the church membership by the deacons,
1. 224 S.W.2d 1007 (Mo. 1949).
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clerk and pastor of the Gallatin Baptist Church, notifying the plaintiff, a member
and regularly ordained minister, to show cause why the hand of fellowship should
not be withdrawn from him because of heresy, was not libelous and actionable per
se in the absence of an allegation of some special loss or injury. In reaching the
foregoing conclusion the court said, "The plaintiff admittedly does not allege or
claim that the language was defamatory of him in his individual capacity and he
does not plead any special loss or injury, and the essential issue and question for
decision is whether in the circumstances alleged in the petition, the words written
and spoken of the plaintiff, fairly construed, are in and of themselves defamatory
and will necessarily occasion loss to the plaintiff in his capacity, character and pro-
fession of a clergyman.... The language must consist of an imputation impeaching
his skill or knowledge, one that tends to disqualify him and render him unfit to full-
fill the duties of his office as a clergyman. ' ' 2
There has been since the time of Charles II a well established distinction be-
tween libel and slander.8 Whether it has been caused by historical accident or is
based upon the allegedly sound theory that to write or publish defamatory material
is more malignant or deliberate, more diffused and more permanent, it is quite gen-
erally said that all libel is actionable per se; i.e. allegations of special damage was
never required.-
In the case of slander, however, a distinction is made between words which are
actionable per see and words which are actionable only on allegation and proof of
special damages. The main classes of cases which have been designated slanderous
per se are: words that 1) impute a crime involving moral turpitude, 2) impute
certain Ioathesome diseases, 3) tend to injure one in his business, office, trade or
profession, or 4) impute unchastity.5
It has been said in regard to the third category, supra, that in slander per se
the ground of the action is that the party is disgraced or injured in his profession,
or exposed to the hazard of losing his office in consequence of the slanderous words,
not that his general reputation and standing in the community is affected by them.6
The words spoken in this class of cases are not actionable themselves but become
so in consequence of the special character of the party of whom they are spoken.
The fact that he has that special character lies at the foundation of the action.
Those reasons, however, have no application to the case of libel. The plaintiff here
should not be under the necessity of relying upon his official reputation for the pur-
pose of maintaining an action; it is not the effect upon it that the suit is predicated
2. Id. at 1007, 1008.
3. King v. Lake, Hardres 470, 145 Eng. Rep. 499 (Ex. 1680); Thorley v.
Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt 355 (1812); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Sec. 568 (1938) (historical
note).
4. HARPER ON TORTS 518 (1933); PROSSER ON TORTS 797 (1941); ODGERS,
LmBEL AND SLANDER 377 (5th ed. 1912); RESTATEMENT, TORTS Sec. 569 (1938).
5. NEWELL ON SLANDER AND LIBrL 62 (4th ed. 1924); PROSSER ON TORTS 798(1941).
6. Forward v. Adams, 7 Wend. 204 (N. Y. 1826); Cramer v. Riggs, 17 Wend.
209 (N. Y. 1837); NEWELL ON SLANDER AND LIBEL 162 (4th ed. 1924).
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on, but rather the effect of the imputation of previous misconduct upon his private
reputation at the time of the publication; i.e. the invoking of scorn, hatred or ridi-
cule of the public upon him.
The universal definition of libel has been, the malicious defamation of a person
made public by any printing or writing tending to hold him up to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and
social intercourse, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided.7 Using this test it is
for the court in the first instance to determine whether the words are reasonably
capable of being so understood.8 It is then for the jury to say whether the words
were in fact so understood by a substantial and respectable group of the public even
though it be a minority one,9 and if the jury should find that the words were not
so understood then no amount of special damages alleged and proved will make the
words libelous.
England's law of defamation has always been the law of this country except for
digressions which raise a question as to whether or not there are now separate
catagories known as libel per se and libel. This discrepancy seems to have arisen
because of the use of similar terms and-a failure to differentiate between libel and
slander as at common law rather than for substantive reasons.
Some courts have treated libel and slander as identical and thus, when there
is a defamatory publication in the form of a libel, if it does not fall within the classes
denoted "actionable per se" as used in slander, special damages must be alleged and
proved.' Cases reaching this result tend to cite and rely upon slander cases without
'observing any distinction."
It is perhaps true that today the word "heresy" does not carry a defamatory
meaning to the general public, and this may certainly be true of a religious group
whose manual 12 indicates their understanding of the meaning of the word. But if
the term is not libelous it should be found not to be so by virtue of the fact that
it did not tend to bring the plaintiff into hatred, contempt or. ridicule, rather than
that it failed to injure him in his profession or that there was no allegation of spe-
cial loss or injury.
FRED KLING
7. Pentuff v. Park, 194 N.C. 146, 138, S.E. 616 (1927); Nelson v. Musgrave,
10 Mo. 648 (1847); NEWELL ON SLANDER AND LIBEL 8, 9 (4th ed. 1924).
8. PROSSER ON TORTS 789, Sec. 91 (1941).
9. PROSSER ON TORTS 784, Sec. 91 (1941); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Sec. 559,
Comment e (1938).
10. Jerald v. Houston, 124 Kan. 657, 261 Pac. 851 (1927); Wiley v. Oklahoma
Press Pub. Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac. 224 (1924); Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hub-
bell Law Directory, 66 N. D. .578, 268 N. W. 400 (1936); Rowan v. Gazette Printing
Co., 74 Mont. 326, 239 Pac. 1035 (1925); Towles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 147,
137 S.W. 2d 1110 (1940).
11. PROSSER ON TORTS 798, n. 61 (1941).
12. Church Manual designed for use by Baptist Churches, By J. M. Pendle-
ton, D.D.-published by American Baptist Publication Society.
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